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iii. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant was convicted of two counts of murder in the 
second degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-5-203, 
both first degree felonies. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 
78-2-2(3)(i), jurisdiction is proper in this Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Is subsection (b) of Utah Code Ann. section 77-35-
21.5 arbitrary, capricious, and violative of Article I, section 
VII of the Utah Constitution? 
2. Did the trial court err in sentencing Appellant to 
the Utah State Prison? 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article I, Section 7, Constitution of Utah 
Section 7. [Due Process of Law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of 
law. 
Utah Code Ann. section 62A-12-204 (1988 Cumulative Supplement, 
replacement volume 7A, Part I): 
(2) The state hospital is authorized to 
receive from any other institution within the 
department any person committed to that 
institution, when a careful evaluation of the 
treatment needs of that person and of the 
treatment programs available at the state 
hospital indicates that the transfer would be 
in the interest of that person. 
(3) The state hospital is required to 
receive any person committed to the state 
prison when ordered by the executive director 
of the department. In making that 
determination, the executive director shall 
consider the treatment needs of that person 
and the treatment programs available at the 
state hospital. Any person so transferred to 
the state hospital shall remain under the 
jurisdiction of the state prison or such 
other institution, and the state hospital 
shall act solely as the agent of the state 
iv. 
prison or such other institution. 
Utah Code Ann. section 64-7-36(10) (Volume 7A, Part II, 1986 
replacement volume): 
(10) The court shall order hospitalization 
if, upon completion of the hearing and 
consideration of the record, the court finds 
by clear and convincing evidence that: 
(a) The proposed patient has a mental 
illness; and 
(b) Because of the patient's illness the 
proposed patient poses an immediate danger of 
physical injury to others or self, which may 
include the inability to provide the basic 
necessities of life, such as food, clothing, 
and shelter, if allowed to remain at liberty; 
and 
(c) The patient lacks the ability to 
engage in a rational decision-making process 
regarding the acceptance of mental treatment 
as demonstrated by evidence of inability to 
weigh the possible costs and benefits of 
treatment; and 
(d) There is no appropriate less 
restrictive alternative to a court order of 
hospitalization; and 
(e) The hospital or mental health 
facility in which the individual is to be 
hospitalized pursuant to this act can provide 
the individual with treatment that is 
adequate and appropriate to the individual's 
conditions and needs.... 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-305 (replacement voliome 8B, 1988 
cumulative supplement): 
.... 
(4) "Mental illness" means a mental 
disease or defect. A mental defect may be a 
congenital condition or one the result of 
injury or a residual effect of a physical or 
mental disease. Mental illness does not mean 
a personality or character disorder or 
abnormality manifested only by repeated 
criminal conduct. 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-35-21.5 (replacement volume 8C, 1988 
cumulative supplement): 
(1) Upon a plea of guilty and mentally 
ill being tendered by a defendant to any 
charge, the court shall hold a hearing within 
a reasonable time to determine the claim of 
mental illness of the defendant. Mental 
v. 
illness, for this purpose, is determined by 
the definition stated in Subsection 76-2-
305(4). The court may order the defendant to 
be evaluated at the Utah State Hospital or 
any other suitable facility, and may receive 
the evidence of any private or public expert 
witness whose evidence is offered by the 
defendant or the prosecutor. A defendant who 
tenders a plea of "guilty and mentally ill" 
shall be examined first by the trial judge in 
compliance with the standards for taking 
pleas of guilty. The defendant shall be 
advised that a plea of guilty and mentally 
ill is a plea of guilty and not a contingent 
plea. If the defendant is later found not to 
be mentally ill, a guilty plea otherwise 
lawfully made remains a valid plea of guilty 
and the defendant shall be sentenced as any 
other offender. If the court concludes that 
the defendant is currently mentally ill, 
applying the standards set forth in this 
section, the defendant's plea shall be 
accepted and he shall be sentenced as a 
mentally ill offender. Expenses of 
examination, observation, or treatment, 
excluding travel to and from any mental 
health facility, shall be charged to the 
county, except when the offense is a state 
offense, the state shall pay part of all of 
the expense where the Legislature has 
expressly appropriated money for this 
purpose. Travel expenses shall be charged to 
the county in which prosecution is 
commenced. Examination of defendants charged 
with municipal or county ordinance violations 
shall be charged to the municipality or 
county commencing the prosecution. 
.... 
(3) If the defendant is found guilty and 
mentally ill, the court shall impose any 
sentence which could be imposed under law 
upon a defendant who is convicted of the same 
offense. Before sentencing, the court shall 
conduct a hearing to determine the 
defendant's present mental status. 
(4) The court shall in its sentence 
order hospitalization at the Utah State 
Hospital or other suitable facility if, upon 
completion of the hearing and consideration 
of the record, the court finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that: 
(a) the defendant has a mental 
illness as defined by Subsection 
76-2-305(4); 
vi. 
(b) because of his mental 
illness the defendant poses an 
immediate physical danger to others 
or self/ which may include 
jeopardizing his own or others1 
safety, health, or welfare if 
placed in a correctional or 
probation setting, or lacks the 
ability to provide the basic 
necessities of life, such as food, 
clothing, and shelter, if placed on 
probation; 
(c) the defendant lacks the 
ability to engage in a rational 
decision-making process regarding 
the acceptance of mental treatment 
as demonstrated by evidence of 
inability to weigh the possible 
costs and benefits of treatment; 
(d) there is no appropriate 
treatment alternative to a court 
order of hospitalization; and 
(e) the Utah State Hospital or 
other suitable facility can provide 
the defendant with treatment, care, 
and custody that is adequate and 
appropriate to the defendant's 
conditions and needs. 
• • • • 
(8) When the Utah State Hospital or 
other suitable facility proposes to discharge 
a defendant prior to the expiration of 
sentence, the institution shall transmit to 
the Board of Pardons a report on the 
condition of the defendant, including the 
clinical facts, the diagnosis, the course of 
treatment, the prognosis for the remission of 
symptoms, the potential for recidivism and 
for the danger to himself and the public, and 
the recommendations for future treatment. 
The Board of Pardons shall direct that the 
defendant serve any or all of the unexpired 
term of the sentence at the Utah State 
Prison, or place the defendant on parole. If 
the Board of Pardon's pursuant to law or 
administrative rules, considers for parole 
any defendant who has been adjudged guilty 
and mentally ill, the board shall consult 
with the treating facility or agency and an 
additional report on the condition of the 
defendant may be filed with the board. 
Pending action of the board, the defendant 
shall remain at the institution at which he 
is hospitalized. If the defendant is placed 
vii. 
on parole, treatment shall, upon the 
recommendation of the hospital facility, be 
made a condition of parole, and failure to 
continue treatment or other condition of 
parole except by agreement with the 
designated facility and the Board of Pardons 
is a basis for initiating parole violation 
hearings. The period of parole may not be 
for fewer than five years or until the 
expiration of the defendant's sentence, 
whichever comes first, and may not be reduced 
without consideration by the Board of Pardons 
of a current report on the mental health 
status of the offender* 
viii. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 25, 1987, Appellant was charged by 
information with two counts of murder in the first degree, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-5-202 (R. 23-25). The 
information was subsequently amended to charge two counts of 
murder in the second degree, to which amended charges Appellant 
entered a plea of guilty and mentally ill (R. 23-25; 28-35). 
After accepting this plea, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 
serve two consecutive terms of five years to life in the Utah 
State Prison (R. 60-61). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
According to Appellant's statement detailing his plea 
of guilty and mentally ill, Appellant, while mentally ill, shot 
and killed Norman Armstrong and Janet Armstrong (R. 29). 
A sentencing hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 
77-35-21.5 occurred on June 14 and 15, 1988. At this hearing, 
various psychiatrists and psychologists testified about 
Appellant's qualifying under the prerequisites, listed in section 
77-35-21.5, to sentencing to the Utah State Hospital or other 
treatment facility. 
The witnesses testified that Appellant is mentally 
retarded and has the mental age of a ten-year-old child (T. 10), 
and that Appellant also suffered brain damage at the age of 
eighteen, resulting in an escalation of Appellant's misbehavior 
("organic personality syndrome") (T. 34-35, 55-57). Some of the 
witnesses testified that Appellant suffers from various 
1 
personality disorders (T. 33, fifth page of defense exhibit 1). 
After hearing this testimony, the court concluded that Appellant 
suffers from mental retardation and several personality 
disorders, which personality disorders, the court concluded, did 
not qualify as "mental illnesses" under section 76-2-305(4). (R. 
72 (page 2 of Appendix I). 
The witnesses agreed that Appellant is dangerous to 
others, particularly when he has access to drugs and alcohol (T. 
42, 96-100). Some of the witnesses testified that Appellant, 
because of his mental illnesses, is in unique danger in the 
prison setting (T. 14, 36-37, 40-41, 48, defense exhibit 3). 
After hearing this testimony, the court recognized that Appellant 
is dangerous to others when he has access to drugs and alcohol, 
and that Appellant, as a result of his mental illnesses, is in 
peculiar danger at the prison (R. 65, 72-74, T.2 17). The court, 
however, rather than recognizing these dangers as reasons under 
section 77-35-21.5(4)(b) that Appellant should be sentenced to 
the Utah State Hospital, wrote a "recommendation" to the Board of 
Pardons and Paroles warning and advising them about the dangers 
posed by and to Appellant (R. 65). 
The witnesses' testimony was most disparate on the 
issue of whether or not Appellant's mental illnesses could be 
treated at the Utah State Hospital. The doctors from the Utah 
State Hospital expressed a general tendency of the Utah State 
Hospital to avoid treatment of those suffering from mental 
retardation (T. 96, 100-103), and because these doctors did not 
2 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Subsection (b) of Utah Code Ann. section 77-35-21.5, 
which requires proof by clear and convincing evidence that a 
mentally ill criminal defendant poses an immediate physical 
danger as a prerequisite to that criminal defendant's treatment 
in the state hospital or other treatment facility violates 
Article I, section VII of the Utah Constitution. The rationale 
underlying subsection (b), that the person subject to commitment 
must pose a danger significant enough to curtail his liberty by 
committing him, originated in the civil involuntary commitment 
context. Because the mentally ill criminal defendant has no 
liberty interest for the statute to protect, and because the 
criminal commitment statute's objectives are treatment of 
criminal defendants and protection of society, there is no logic 
in requiring that a mentally ill criminal defendant manifest that 
he poses physical danger in order to obtain treatment in a mental 
health facility. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-305(4) excludes from the 
definition of mental illnesses only those personality disorders, 
character disorders, and abnormalities which are "manifested only 
by repeated criminal conduct". Id_. The trial court's 
interpretation of section 76-2-305(4) as excluding all 
personality disorders from the definition of mental illness is 
erroneous, and should be corrected by this Court. 
In the event that this Court finds that subsection (b) 
of section 77-35-21.5 is constitutional, there was ample 
evidence, both in the testimony at the sentencing hearing and in 
4 
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disregard of the sentencing statute, this Court should vacate 
Appellant's sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance 
with standards set forth in section 77-35-21*5# as clarified by 
this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE APPLICATION OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 77-35-21.5(4)(b) 
TO MENTALLY ILL CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 
VIOLATES ARTICLE I SECTION 7 OF 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
In State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988)# this 
Court evaluated criteria listed under Utah Code Ann. section 77-
35-21.5, to be considered in sentencing criminal defendants found 
"guilty and mentally ill". This Court noted that the criteria 
1 Utah Code Ann. section 77-35-21.5(4) lists the 
following criteria which, if demonstrated by the defendant by 
clear and convincing evidence, entitle the defendant to be 
sentenced to the Utah State Hospital or other appropriate 
facility: 
(a) the defendant has a mental illness 
as defined by Subsection 76-2-305(4); 
(b) because of his mental illness the 
defendant poses an immediate physical danger 
to others or self, which may include 
jeopardizing his own or others* safety, 
health, or welfare if placed in a 
correctional or probation setting, or lacks 
the ability to provide the basic necessities 
of life, such as food, clothing, and shelter, 
if placed on probation; 
(c) the defendant lacks the ability to 
engage in a rational decision-making process 
regarding the acceptance of mental treatment 
as demonstrated by evidence of inability to 
weigh the possible costs and benefits of 
treatment; 
(d) there is no appropriate treatment 
alternative to a court order of 
hospitalization; and 
(e) the Utah State Hospital or other 
6 
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protection against a potentially dangerous 
individual. 
Id. 
This Court found that subsections (c) and (d) of 
section 77-35-21.5 are not relevant to the criminal sentencing 
process, and struck those two subsections as unconstitutional. 
Id. at 1271-1272. This Court explained that subsection (c)# 
which requires a finding that the person subject to involuntary 
commitment is incapable of making therapeutic decisions for 
himself, was created in the civil involuntary commitment statute 
to insure that the State, justified only by the protective theory 
of parens patriae, does not make therapeutic choices and thereby 
usurp the liberty of a person who is able to make equally valid 
therapeutic choices for himself. JEd. at 1271. This Court found 
that because the criminal defendant is faced with either a 
sentence of imprisonment or criminal commitment, there is no 
liberty interest at stake in the sentencing, but only an interest 
in treatment. I^ci. Because this Court saw no rational reason to 
deprive a criminal defendant of treatment merely because he 
recognizes his need for it, this Court struck criteria (c) from 
the criminal commitment statute. Ld. at 12 72. 
This Court explained that subsection (d), which 
requires that there be "no appropriate treatment alternative to a 
court order of hospitalization", seeks the least restrictive 
alternative in accordance with the civil commitment focus on the 
mentally ill person's interest in liberty, ^d. This Court found 
that the civil commitment goal of giving the best possible 
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This Court concluded: 
The means employee in subsections (c) 
and (d) of section 77-35-21.5(4), however, 
are unintelligible in the context of the 
statute's purposes. The legislature's 
intent in section 77-35-21.5 is to provide 
for treatment, as opposed to imprisonment, <»[ 
the mentally ill offender• Not one of the 
considerations i:. subsections (: • an-.-1 'd) is 
relevant to the treatment rationale* The 
application of those provisions to a mentally 
ill criminal defendant !s thus arbitrary and 
capricious, in violation of the due process 
guarantee of article I, section VII of the 
Utah Constitution 
Subsection (b) of section , *,jb--i,.i iciiu'i i M M in* 
(b) because of his mental 
i 1 lness the defendant poses an 
immediate physical danger to others 
or sel f, which may include 
jeopardizing his own or others' 
safety, health, or welfare if 
placed in a correctional or 
probation setting, or lacks the 
ability to provide the basic 
necessities of life, such as food, 
clothing, and shelter, i f placed on, 
probat i on 
This dangerousness cri t e r i o n a] so a p p e a r s .. 
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criterion was created to protect the liberty interests of the 
person subject to civil commitment - the danger posed by that 
person must be sufficiently high to justify defeating his liberty 
interests by committing him to an institution. Developments in 
the Law — Civil Commitment of the Mentally 111, 87 Harv. L.Rev. 
1190, 1236 (1974). 
The dangerousness criterion has no relevance in the 
context of criminal sentencing, where the person seeking 
treatment for mental illness has no liberty interest at stake. 
Particularly because this Court has identified the "defendant's 
right to treatment and society's right to protection against a 
potentially dangerous individual" as the rights at issue in the 
criminal commitment context, Copeland at 1271, there is no logic 
in requiring a showing that a criminal defendant poses an 
immediate physical danger before that defendant can be committed 
to the Utah State Hospital or other treatment, facility. Cf. 
Copeland at 1272 ("If neither the hospital nor any other facility 
can provide 'treatment, care and custody that is adequate and 
appropriate to the defendant's conditions and needs,' placement 
in such a facility may not be justified because of the additional 
if, upon completion of the hearing and 
consideration of the record, the court finds 
by clear and convincing evidence that: 
• • •. 
(b) Because of the patient's illness the 
proposed patient poses an immediate danger of 
physical injury to others or self, which may 
include the inability to provide the basic 
necessities of life, such as food, clothing, 
and shelter, if allowed to remain at 
liberty... 
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II. 
T H E T R I A L C 0 U R T E R R E D I N SENTENCING 
APPELLANT TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON. 
On 
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finds by clear and convincing evidence that 
the defendant has a mental illness; that the 
defendant poses immediate physical, danger to 
himself or others or is incapable of 
providing the necessities of life, so that 
correctional or probationary disposition 
would be improper; .». and that 
hospitalization will meet the defended! 's 
conditions a::l "if***-* -
State v. Deplon^, '4 . - T 6 (Utah I?f>n >. 
On * -I*-- f<iurt sentenced Appellant ?c 
serve two co .. i> i =* utah 
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The trial court's errors are primarily related to 
questions of law, which are generally not afforded deference by 
this Court on review. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52. The 
standard of review of the trial court's factual findings is the 
"clearly erroneous" standard of review. State v. DePlonty, 749 
P.2d 621# 627 (Utah 1987). 
A. Mental Illness as Defined by Utah Code Ann, section 76-2-
305(4) 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-305 (replacement volume 8B, 
1988) defines mental illness for purposes of sentencing under 
section 77-35-21.5. Section 76-2-305 states, in part: 
(4) "Mental illness" means a mental 
disease or defect. A mental defect may be a 
congenital condition or one the result of 
injury or a residual effect of a physical or 
mental disease. Mental illness does not 
mean a personality or character disorder or 
abnormality manifested only by repeated 
criminal conduct. 
The trial court found that Appellant was mildly to 
moderately mentally retarded, and that Appellant's mental 
retardation constitutes a statutory mental illness satisfying 
subsection (a) of section 77-35-21.5 (R. 72). The court 
recognized that Appellant has "several personality disorders and 
tends to abuse drugs and alcohol", but concluded that these 
latter afflictions were excluded from the definition of mental 
illness provided in section 76-2-305(4) by the language "Mental 
illness does not mean a personality or character disorder" (R. 
72)(T.2 16-17, 21). 
As will be discussed infra, the court erred in 
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"or subdivision thereof" modified only the antecedent "county", 
or whether it also modified the word "state". Salt Lake City at 
740. This Court espoused a practical application of the "last 
antecedent rule": 
[Q]ualifying words and phrases are generally 
regarded as applying to the immediately 
preceding words, rather than to more remote 
ones. 
• • • • 
When applied with [the objective of 
assisting in the ascertainment of legislative 
intent], it will be seen that the so called 
"last antecedent rule" is not necessarily 
limited to the one term immediately 
preceding, but if there are several preceding 
terms of the same character, it may modify 
all of such terms, if the natural and 
sensible meaning of the wording so requires. 
E.G., a reference to horses, cattle, sheep, 
or any of their young, would not mean only 
the lambs of the sheep, but would mean the 
young of all three classes, colts, calves and 
lambs. 
Id. at 740-741. 
In the instant case, the terms personality disorder, 
character disorder, and abnormality are synonyms, or terms "of 
the same character", and it is logical to construe the phrase 
"manifested only by repeated criminal acts" as qualifying all 
three terms. 
I n
 Salt Lake City, this Court also explained that "the 
statute should be looked at in its entirety and in accordance 
with the purpose which was sought to be accomplished." jtcl. at 
741. Section 76-2-305(4) was enacted for the purpose of 
providing appropriate legal and medical treatment for mentally 
ill criminal defendants. While there may be a rational basis for 
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distinguishing between the legal and medical treatment of 
criminal defendants whose sole abnormality is repeated criminal 
conduct from criminal defendants with other mental illnesses, 
there is no rational basis to distinguish between criminal 
defendants with personality or character disorders and criminal 
defendants with other mental illnesses. 
This Court should correct the trial court's 
misinterpretation by recognizing that under section 76-2-305(4)# 
only those personality disorders, character disorders, and 
abnormalities which are manifested solely by repeated criminal 
conduct are excluded from the definition of mental illness. 
2. Appellant suffers from numerous mental illnesses that are not 
"manifested only by repeated criminal conduct". 
There is ample evidence to support the court's 
conclusion that Appellant is mentally retarded and thus 
statutorily mentally ill - numerous physicians testified that 
Appellant has the mental age of a ten-year-old (T. 28-29, 49). 
There was no dispute among the witnesses at trial that mental 
retardation qualifies as a mental illness under section 76-2-
305(4). (T. 12, 84). 
Also, when Appellant was 18 years of age, he suffered a 
lung disease which impeded the supply of oxygen to his brain (T. 
34). This "anoxia" apparently exacerbated Appellant's mental 
retardation and began the escalation of Appellant's behavioral 
problems (T. 35). Dr. Golding explained that this injury and its 
behavioral consequences are diagnosed as "organic personality 
syndrome" (T. 55-57). 
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There is also ample evidence to support the court's 
conclusion that Appellant suffers from personality disorders. 
Stephen Golding, a doctor and professor of psychology and 
director of clinical training at the University of Utah, 
testified that Appellant suffers from three personality 
disorders: "^dependent personality disorder, schizoid personality 
and antisocial personality disorder.%" (T. 33). The clinical 
director of Davis County Mental Health Center, Orin Howard 
Ogilvie, M.D., concluded that Appellant suffers from a "Mixed 
Personality Disorder with Antisocial and Dependent Features" 
(defense exhibit 1). 
The fact that Appellant's personality disorders are 
manifested by symptoms other than repeated criminal conduct, and 
therefore could qualify as mental illnesses under section 76-2-
305(4) is demonstrated by reference to Dr. Golding1s detailed 
description of Appellant's illnesses, which is provided in 
Appendix II to this brief. 
The trial court should have concluded that Appellant 
is statutorily mentally ill because he suffers not only from 
mental defects (mental retardation and organic personality 
syndrome), but also from mental diseases (personality disorders 
characterized by factors other than repeated criminal conduct). 
Its failure to do so, resulting from its misinterpretation of the 
statutory definition of mental illness, was error. 
B. Immediate Physical Danger to Others or Self 
Appellant stands by his argument that subsection (b) of 
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section 77-35-21.5 is unconstitutional because it cannot be 
applied rationally in the context of criminal commitment of those 
found guilty and mentally ill. See Point I. In the event that 
this Court disagrees, the following discussion under subpoint B 
of Point II of this brief demonstrates that there was clear and 
convincing evidence that Appellant, because of his mental 
illnesses, poses a physical danger to others and himself in the 
prison, which evidence the court recognized in its misapplication 
of the law. 
The second requirement addressed by the trial court was 
that embodied in subsection (b) of 77-35-21.5: 
(b) because of his mental illness the 
defendant poses an immediate physical danger 
to others or self, which may include 
jeopardizing his own or others1 safety, 
health, or welfare if placed in a 
correctional or probation setting, or lacks 
the ability to provide the basic necessities 
of life, such as food, clothing, and shelter, 
if placed on probation[.] 
The trial court's formal findings indicate that 
Appellant's previous record of incarceration bore no proof that 
Appellant had difficulties while incarcerated, and thus proved 
that Appellant is not in danger in the correctional setting (R. 
72). The findings also indicate that Appellant is only dangerous 
to others when he has access to drugs and alcohol (R. 72). The 
court concluded that Appellant did not need to be treated at the 
Utah State Hospital because Appellant would have no access to 
drugs and alcohol in prison, and thus would not pose a danger to 
others, and because Appellant was not in danger in the prison (R. 
17 
72, T.2 17). 
These formal findings are illuminated by the following 
"prison term recommendation": 
Mr. Anderson is mildly to mildly/moderately 
mentally retarded and will require special 
screening for appropriate treatment and 
housing. The evidence indicates that he can 
become dangerous if using alcohol or drugs. 
I recommend that Mr. Anderson serve a life 
term on each count and not be paroled. 
He should serve his term in Special Services 
Dorm or similar facility deemed appropriate. 
(R. 65). 
As will be discussed infra, this ruling was factually 
and legally erroneous for three reasons: 1) the trial court had 
no evidence that Appellant would not have access to drugs and/or 
alcohol in the prison, 2) as the court recognized, because of 
Appellant's mental defects and illnesses, he cannot function 
safely in the prison, 3) neither the sentencing statute nor any 
other statute authorizes the judge to dictate the conditions of 
Appellant's circumstances in the prison in an effort to mollify 
the dangers posed by and to Appellant as a result of his mental 
illnesses, in lieu of granting Appellant his statutory right to 
treatment for his mental illnesses. 
1. Appellant poses a danger, particularly because in prison, he 
has access to drugs and/or alcohol. 
While there is ample evidence to support the court's 
finding that Appellant is physically dangerous, particularly when 
he has access to drugs and alcohol (T. 42, 96-100), there is 
absolutely no evidence presented to support the court's 
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assumption that the court can, through a "recommendation", 
prevent Appellant from having access to drugs or alcohol while 
incarcerated in the prison. Dr. Stephen Golding, in fact, 
testified that such substances are readily available in the 
prison (T. 41). The court's warning to the Board of Pardons and 
Paroles that Appellant is dangerous when he has access to drugs 
and alcohol demonstrates the court's awareness of the actual 
availability of these things in the prison (R. 65). 
The court's ruling pertinent to subsection (e) of 
section 77-35-21.5 also demonstrates that the court recognized 
Appellant as dangerous: 
Further, ... the Utah State Hospital cannot 
provide the secure custody necessary for the 
defendant who stands convicted of two 
homicides in Salt Lake County, is awaiting 
sentencing in Davis County on a subsequent 
Second Degree Homicide, and who tends to 
abuse drugs and/or alcohol. 
(R. 73-74). 
2. Appellant, because of his mental illness, is in unique danger 
in the prison. 
In addition to the evidence that Appellant poses a 
danger to others in the prison, there is clear and convincing 
evidence that because of Appellant's mental retardation and 
personality disorders, he is in unique danger in the prison. In 
1973, psychologist Judith Shepherd, director of the diagnostic 
unit of the Utah State Prison, wrote a psychological evaluation 
resulting from Appellant's ninety day stay at the Utah State 
Prison (defense exhibit 2). The conclusion of her psychological 
evaluation was that at that time, Appellant could not function in 
19 
the environment of the prison: 
It is believed that Mr. Anderson would 
be incapable of coping with a prison 
environment. He is unable to assert himself 
in his own defense and is easily led, used 
and abused by others as he has been observed 
in his short time here.*.. 
(3rd page of defense exhibit 2). Doctors Ogilvie and Golding 
also expressed their opinions that Appellant, because of his 
mental illnesses, cannot live safely at the prison (T. 14, 40-41, 
48, page 1 of defense exhibit 3). 
The court's oral ruling pertaining to subsection (c) of 
77-35-21.5, which has subsequently been stricken as 
unconstitutional by this Court, demonstrates that the court 
indeed recognized that Appellant would be endangered by reason of 
his mental illnesses if placed in the prison: 
There is concern on the part of the Court 
concerning you, that I would have for a 
youthful offender. The State Prison does 
segregate out there and they segregate sexual 
offenders. They segregate youthful 
offenders. They have different areas and 
they certainly — they have psychologists, 
they have psychiatrists, they have vocational 
programs. They have the ability to help you 
to cope... 
(T.2 19). 
Again, rather than following section 77-35-21.5, by 
sentencing Appellant to the Utah State Hospital because Appellant 
met the statutory criteria, the court attempted to mitigate the 
degree of danger posed to Appellant in the prison by virtue of 
his mental illnesses, by recommending to the Board of Pardons and 
Paroles that Appellant receive special restrictions and 
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protection while in prison (R. 65). 
3. The trial court's recommendation to the Board of Pardons and 
Paroles is no substitute for the treatment to which Appellant is 
statutorily entitled? 
In submitting the recommendation to the Board of 
Pardons and Paroles to house Appellant in the Special Services 
Dorm and to be aware of the dangers posed by Appellant, the court 
was acting "pursuant to the provisions of Section 77-18-5, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended 1980," (R. 65), which provided as 
follows: 
In cases where an indeterminate sentence 
is imposed, the judge and prosecuting 
attorney may, within 30 days, mail a 
statement to the board of pardons setting 
forth the term for which the prisoner ought 
to be imprisoned together with any 
information which might aid the board in 
passing on the application for termination or 
commutation of the sentence or for parole or 
pardon. 
This statute neither binds nor empowers the Board of 
Pardons and Paroles to implement the trial court's 
recommendations. Rather than hoping that the prison 
administration would follow the court's recommendations to 
protect against the dangers posed by and to Appellant in the 
prison, the court should have found that those dangers qualify 
Appellant for treatment in the State Hospital or other treatment 
facility under subsection (b) of Utah Code Ann. section 77-35-
21.5. 
C. Facility Providing Adequate Treatment, Care, and Custody 
The last factor considered by the trial court was that 
embodied in subsection (e) of section 77-35-21.5: 
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(e) the Utah State Hospital or 
other suitable facility can provide 
the defendant with treatment, care# 
and custody that is adequate and 
appropriate to the defendant's 
conditions and needs. 
The trial court concluded that 
the Utah State Hospital is not a suitable 
facility for providing the defendant with the 
treatment, care and custody that is adequate 
and appropriate to the defendant's conditions 
and needs, because no therapies are available 
to treat the defendant's problem of 
retardation which is permanent. Further, ... 
the Utah State Hospital cannot provide the 
secure custody necessary for the defendant 
who stands convicted of two homicides in Salt 
Lake County, is awaiting sentencing in Davis 
County on a subsequent Second Degree 
Homicide, and who tends to abuse drugs 
and/or alcohol. 
(R. 73-74). 
This ruling is erroneous for three reasons: 1) the fact 
that Appellant's mental retardation cannot be physically "cured" 
does not deprive Appellant of his right to treatment, which 
treatment is available at the State Hospital and Training School 
and 2) the hospital is able to treat Appellant's personality 
disorders, which the court erroneously failed to consider as 
mental illnesses under section 76-2-305(4), 3) subsection (e) 
does not, as the court believed, force the court to choose 
between sentencing to the Utah State Hospital or the prison. 
Furthermore, there is no statutory basis for the court's 
consideration under subsection (e) the danger posed by Appellant 
in the state hospital, particularly if this Court upholds the 
statutory language of subsection (b) of section 77-35-21.5, which 
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requires a showing of dangerousness in order for Appellant to 
receive treatment. 
1. "Treatment" under subsection (e) 
As noted above, the basis of the trial court's ruling 
that Appellant did not qualify to be sentenced to a treatment 
facility was that the only mental illness the trial court thought 
statutorily relevant - mental retardation - is permanent and 
cannot be cured. 
This Court should correct the trial court's unduly 
rigid view of "treatment, care, and custody" under subsection (e) 
of section 77-35-21.5. In Matter of Giles, 657 P.2d 285 (Utah 
1982), the appellant was involuntarily civilly committed to the 
Utah State Hospital after serving a prior commitment resulting 
from his having been found not guilty by reason of insanity of 
aggravated assault. In addressing the fifth prerequisite to 
civil commitment, this Court referred to and quoted Colyar v. 
Third Judicial Dist. Court, 469 F.Supp. 424 (10th Cir. 1979), in 
explaining that "in a given case custody might have to be the 
main aspect of the treatment: 
The use of the word 'treatment' here should 
not be construed to preclude the possibility 
of an individual seeking custodial care. Nor 
should it be construed as implying that the 
state may commit only those for whom there is 
currently a proven efficacious treatment. It 
is unfortunate, but true, that at the present 
time there are many emotional disturbances 
that do not lend themselves to treatment and 
cure. Therefore, for the purposes of this 
decision, the court assumes, without 
deciding, that a state may validly recognize 
this reality, and, given conformity to other 
due process requirements, may involuntarily 
23 
commit an individual for custodial care, 
though no known treatment is available. Id. 
[Colyar] at 431, Note 5." 
Giles at 288-289. See also State v. DePlonty, 749 P.2d 621, 626 
(Utah 1988)(defendant, whose case was remanded for resentencing 
under section 77-35-21.5 suffered from "largely irreversible" 
chronic brain damage ("mixed organic brain syndrome")). 
In this case, while there was no evidence that 
Appellant's mental retardation could be reversed by treatment in 
the State Hospital, there was evidence that Appellant could 
learn, through therapy, to function more successfully. Dr. 
Golding stated that the State Hospital can provide cognitive and 
social skills training and psychotherapy for Appellant, as modes 
of treating the manifestations of Appellant's mental retardation, 
organic personality syndrome, and personality disorders (T. 51-
56, 71). He concluded that the Utah State Hospital is the 
optimal treatment facility for Appellant (T. 80). 
The trial court's interpretation of subsection (e) as a 
requirement that a mental illness must be completely curable in 
order to qualify the patient for sentencing to a therapeutic 
facility should be corrected by this Court. 
2. Treatment of Appellant's mental illnesses 
Dr. Golding explained in detail at trial Appellant's 
treatment needs for his mental retardation, organic personality 
syndrome, and personality disorders (T. 51-57, attached as 
Appendix III). He testified that the optimal location for 
Appellant's treatment is the Utah State Hospital (T. 53). 
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All of the doctors from the Utah State Hospital 
expressed their preference not to treat mentally retarded people 
at the Hospital, but admitted that they do treat those mentally 
retarded people who have other mental illnesses (T. 96, 100-103)• 
The basis of their conclusions that Appellant was not eligible 
for treatment at the Utah State Hospital was that they did not 
agree with the trial court's and Dr. Golding's finding that 
Appellant suffers from several personality disorders (T. 83, 84, 
104, 129)* They did testify that the State Hospital is fully 
equipped to treat such problems (T. 87, 94, 133-134). One of the 
doctors testified that the appropriate treatment facility for 
Appellant was the State Training school (T. 103). 
While the doctors from the State Hospital did not feel 
that Appellant suffers from personality disorders, the trial 
court found that he does (T.2 16, 17, 21). The doctors said that 
the personality disorders were treatable at the State Hospital, 
but the trial court did not consider the potential for treatment 
of Appellant's personality disorders at the State Hospital or 
other treatment facility because the court erroneously concluded 
that the personality disorders were excluded from the definition 
of mental illnesses legally entitled to treatment provided in 
section 76-2-305(4). (R. 72). 
Because the Utah State Hospital can provide Appellant 
with "treatment, care, and custody that is adequate and 
appropriate to [his] conditions and needs", the trial court 
should have found that Appellant qualifies for treatment under 
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section 77-35-21.5 (e). 
3* Subsection (e) allows for sentencing to treatment facilities 
other than the State Hospital* 
Although Dr. Howell testified that the optimal 
treatment facility for Appellant was the State Training School 
(T. 103)# the court did not even consider this as a possibility 
under the sentencing statute. During the court's oral ruling, 
the court stated, 
And No. 5, that the Utah State Hospital is 
suitable and good for your treatment. And I 
must deal with each one of those if you meet 
all five, then this Court would have no 
choice but to order your hospitalization at 
the Utah State Hospital. 
(T.2 16). 
Contrary to the trial court's perspective, section 77-
35-21.5 allows for sentencing to the State Hospital or "other 
suitable facility". The trial court's failure to consider 
sentencing Appellant to the State Training School for treatment 
of his mental retardation was error. 
4. Consideration of Dangers Posed By Appellant in Hospital 
Setting 
As noted above, part of the trial court's basis in 
concluding that Appellant does not qualify for treatment under 
subsection (e) is that Appellant is dangerous (R. 73-74). Given 
that subsection (b) of section 77-35-21.5 poses as one of two 
alternative prerequisites to treatment a showing that Appellant 
poses an immediate physical danger, the trial court should not 
have used the danger posed by Appellant as a reason to deny 
Appellant treatment. 
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Even if subsection (b) is stricken by this Court as 
unconstitutional, it is not reasonable to allow the trial court, 
acting under subsection (e) of section 77-35-21.5, to deny 
Appellant treatment in the State Hospital because Appellant is 
dangerous. There is no language in section 77-35-21.5 that 
allows for denial of treatment on the basis of the danger posed 
by a mentally ill person. Other statutes governing the State 
Hospital require its admission of dangerous patients who are 
civilly committed, and its admission of criminal defendants 
without regard to the threat that they pose. See e.g. Utah Code 
Ann. sections 64-7-36 (civil commitment); 62A-12-204 (2) and (3) 
(State Hospital must accept "any" persons from other institutions 
and from the prison after evaluation of the treatment needs of 
those persons and the availability of treatment programs to meet 
those needs). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should vacate Appellant's sentence, correct 
the trial court's erroneous views of Utah Code Ann. section 77-
35-21.5, and remand the case for sentencing in accordance with 
proper standards.
 k A 
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of the foregoing were delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, and 
that four copies of the foregoing will mailed, postage prepaid, 
to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84114, this , 1989. 
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TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
HOWARD R. LEMCKE 
GREGORY L. BOWN 
Deputy County Attorneys 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
RUSSELL MINER ANDERSON, 
Defendant. 
FINDING OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. Cft 88 528 • 
Hon. Leonard H. Russon 
The defendant, Russell M. Anderson, represented by James 
Valdez and James Bradshaw, having plead guilty and mentally ill to 
two counts of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, both 
first degree felonies, and the Court having appointed alienists 
and having received their reports, and the Court having heard 
testimony from five (5) mental health professionals and two (2) 
jailers on June 14, 1988, and the Court having considered several 
offered exhibits and relevant portions of a presentence report 
prepared by Adult Probation and Parole makes the following 
findings: 
1. Section 77-35-21.5(4), Utah Code Annotated mandates 
hospitalization for a person pleading guilty and mentally ill if 
the defendant establishes by clear and convincing evidence that 
all five sub-parts of Section 77-25-21.5(4) exist. 
00LG71 
Finding of Fact and 
Conclusion 
Case No. CR 87-528 
Page two 
2. With regard to subsection (a) of Section 
77-35-21.5(4), the Court finds that the defendant is mildly to 
moderately mentally retarded. Further, that mental retardation is 
a mental defect as defined in Section 76-2-305(4) and that 
therefore the defendant has a statutory mental illness. 
3e The Court finds that the defendant has several 
personality disorders and tends to abuse drugs and alcohol, 
conditions which do not constitute mental illness as defined by 
Section 76-2-305(4). 
4. The Court further finds that the defendant has no 
mental illness as defined in 76-2-305(4) other than the mental 
retardation described in paragraph 2 above. 
5. With regard to subsection (b) of Section 
77-35-21.5(4) the Court finds that, because of his mental illness, 
the defendant would not pose an immediate physical danger to 
himself or others were he placed into a correctional setting where 
he would not have access to drugs or alcohol. Further, the Court 
finds that the defendant will be able to function at the Utah 
State Prison based upon the evidence adduced with regard to the 
defendant's prison incarceration in 1981 and 1982 and the present 
functioning of the defendant in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
6. With regard to subsection (c) of Section 
77-35-21.5(4) the Court finds that the defendant can make rational 
decisions regarding the acceptance of mental treatment by weighing 
(in* *vrv-: 
Finding of Fact and 
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the possible costs and benefits of treatment, even though the 
defendant is mildly to moderately retarded and has a mental age of 
10. The defendant should not be confused with a 10 year old child 
in terms of sophistication, knowledge or innocence, but instead 
has the same ability to learn and perceive as a normal 10 year old 
and could follow the direction of a treating psychiatrist without 
having a complete understanding of the technical jargon and 
methodologies used by that psychiatrist. 
7. With regard to subsection (d) of Section 
77-35-21.5(4) the Court finds that the Utah State Prison provides 
an appropriate treatment alternative to a court order of 
hospitalization for this defendant. That based upon the testimony 
of the psychiatrists who work both at the Utah State Prison and 
the Utah State Hospital. Further, that the Utah State Prison has 
some programs suited to those of the defendant's needs that can be 
addressed by treatment therapies. 
8. With regard to subsection (e) of Section 
77-35-21.5(4) the Court finds that the Utah State Hospital is not 
a suitable facility for providing the defendant with the 
treatment, care and custody that is adequate and appropriate to 
the defendant's conditions and needs, because no therapies are 
available to treat the defendant's problem of retardation which is 
permanent. Further, that the Utah State Hospital cannot provide 
the secure custody necessary for the defendant who stands 
00LC7J 
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convicted of two homicides in Salt Lake County, is awaiting 
sentencing in Davis County on a subsequent Second Degree Homicide, 
and who tends to abuse drugs and/or alcohol. 
9. In sum, the Court finds the defendant has failed to 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that all five 
requirements of Section 77-35-21.5(4) have been met. Although the 
defendant did establish by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant has a mental illness as required by subsection (a) of 
Section 77-35-21.5(4), the defendant not only did not meet the 
burden required to establish requirements (b) through (e), but the 
evidence of those points was contrary to the defendant's 
contention. 
THERFORE, the Court concludes that there is no compulsion 
under Section 77-35-21.5(4) to order hospitalization at the Utah 
State Hospital or other suitable mental health facility in 
sentencing Russell Miner Anderson in this matter. 
DATED this ^y daY o£ J u n e> 1988-
BY THE COURT: 
VNARD ti. RUSSON, JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HSNDLEY 
'^ CLE6K .. 
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Approved as to form 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Carol Beatie, hereby certify that I delivered Finding 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law to James Valdez and James Bradshaw, 
Attorneys for the Defendant, Russell Miner Anderson, on the 
day of June, 1988. 
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APPENDIX 2 
DR. GOLDING'S DESCRIPTION OF 
APPELLANT'S MENTAL ILLNESSES 
faking he would have had all kinds of other things that he 
would have been doing at a different level in his life: 
vocationally and socially and personally and so forth and 
so on. So, no, he couldn't be faking in any real sense. 
Q There is nothing in these 20-some-odd IQ tests 
fi | or in these numerous reports that you reviewed that is 
j 
7 1 in any way inconsistent with your conclusion that he is, 
in fact, retarded? 
9 j A That is correct, there is nothing that is 
inconsistent. 
Q Beyond the retardation, you made certain 
conclusions, you drew certain conclusions as to his mental 
state? 
A Yes. 
15 I Q Could you please tell us what those are? 
16 I A Well, in brief form, Mr. Anderson has a variety 
17 I of personality difficulties which qualify, in my opinion, 
18 I as mental disorders which are briefly summarizable as 
19 J follows: He has a great deal of difficulty, partially 
20 I flowing from the retardation, in judging social reality 
21 I in an appropriate fashion. He has a great need, again 
22 J partially flowing from his retardation, to have other 
23 j people basically take care of important social judgments 
24
 J for him. That is, he is dependent on others to a large 
25
 I extent. He has — 
8 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
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Q Is there a specific diagnosis? j 
A I will come to that in a moment. I prefer to I 
just describe it and then give the kinds of conclusary J 
labels, if you will, at the end. I 
He has a very poorly developed sense of self I 
and self esteem, and is extremely sensitive, as I think j 
would be obvious for a person who has lived with retardation j 
for a long time, sensitive to what others think about him J 
to the point where he actually, over the past 15 years, j 
has lived a fairly socially isolated kind of life. That is, j 
he is very uncomfortable around other people. He experiences! 
a great deal of what would be termed "social anxiety." He I 
is extremely uncomfortable with interpersonal closeness I 
with others. He doesn't trust other people. He doesn't I 
trust what they are going to do or what they think about J 
him. And as a consequence of all of this, he has engaged j 
in a variety of very poor social judgments. He does not I 
feel very good about himself. That is a quote by a way J 
of expressing low self-esteem and also a fair statement of I 
chronic low level depression has led to him using and I 
this is not uncommon. He is using a whole variety of J 
drugs and other forms of medications, most of them illegal, I 
to alter his mood. That is, he uses drugs whether that J 
be marijuana or LSD or other sorts of things to alter his I 
mood, to make him feel better about himself. And this I 
I 
32 
10 
11 
12 
chronic pattern of not getting — not trusting other 
people, feeling very anxious around other people, depending 
on other people, being willing to do things for other 
people so that they will sort of like him, but not really 
wanting to be around most people very much, using drugs 
and medications to alter his mood and so forth is a pattern-
that has existed for a long time. Since approximately the 
8 ] age of 18, from both his report, the reports that were 
9 J available to me, and other indications* All of that 
ties together technically, if you want a technical 
conclusion* 
All of that ties together in a diagnostic 
J summary presented in my report which, in essence, says 
u I that if you want to go by the standard of the American 
!5 I Psychiatric Association, as an example, there are other 
16 I standards, if you want to go by the standard of the 
17 I American Psychiatric Association, you would say of him 
18 I that in addition to the retardation, and also some possible 
19 I organic disorder caused by an illness at approximately the 
20 I age of 18, that he has several personality disorders. 
21 J Q What are those? 
22 I A Well, the technical names are "dependent 
23 I personality disorder, schizoid personality and antisocial 
24 I personality disorder." 
25
 • He meets the criteria for all three. Therefore, 
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APPENDIX 3 
DR. GOLDING'S DESCRIPT OF 
TREATMENT NEEDS OF APPELLANT 
socially appropriate. All of those kinds of treatments, J 
that is, treatment in individual kind of counseling or I 
psychotherapy, cognitive and social skill training in a J 
structural environment, and substance abuse therapy or J 
other kinds of interventions are commonly available in J 
institutions. I 
Q Are you familiar with the facilities frequently J 
available at the Utah State Hospital? I 
A I have some familiarity with that. I 
Q How about other State Hospitals? 1 
A Because of the nature of my work, I have worked 
directly or been a consultant in approximately eight or I 
nine other State Hospitals in Connecticut, North Carolina, 
Indiana, British Columbia, all of which are state institutions] 
with all of the problems and so forth attendant to state 
institutions are pretty much the same. 
Q In your opinion, where would Russell Anderson 
receive the most appropriate treatment for the problems 
you have described? 
A Well, I characterize the type of institution in 
an institution which primarily deals with adults who have 
both behavioral problems and significant kinds of mental 
disorders. It is not uncommon for them to also have some 
degree of retardation, as does Mr. Anderson, and there 
are a variety of such institutions available. The only 
one I know of — 
MR. LEMCKE: I will object to the answer as 
unresponsive in terms of the Utah State Hospital. 
THE COURT: I will sustain the objection. 
You may restate your question. 
Q (By Mr. Bradshaw) The question, well, do you 
have an opinion as to where the most appropriate — 
where Russell Anderson could receive the most appropriate 
treatment? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q And what is that? 
A At the Utah State Hospital. 
Q Specifically, what are the conditions and 
needs that Russell has in terms of treatment? 
A He needs to be in a closely supervised environment 
in which he can receive treatment for his dependency upon 
substances to alter his mood. He needs to be in a 
structured environment where he receives cognitive and 
social skill training with other adults, so that he can 
learn in an appropriate situation how to deal with the 
normal stresses of adults dealing with each other, about 
ordinary day-to-day events. He needs to be in a structured 
situation which has some degree of flexibility so that as 
he progresses he can be progressively under less and less 
supervision and not have it be kind of, you know, black 
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,inci w h i t e k ind of t h i n q lie needs t o be in an environment 
I I It I L l i l l I Of t <M ill ill I I H I '," I 11 IJ J t t *J I I ' l l ! 
lit" needs t o be in a f a c i l i t y t h a t w i l l provide him w i t h 
itnilnit" p s y c h o t h e r a p y and l am j u s t r e p e a t i n g what I s a i d 
i i >>'i| li'.f • I I In1 i Mir i | ues l J Mi1. 
Q What is aduJt psychotherapy? 
A What is adult psychotherapy'1 It means the kiriril* 
of counseling i psychotherapy Midi que-, un yunllh i H | I I • • I 
to a person who has Mr,, Anderson's kinds of adult needs and 
his. deqret'j r t impairment with respect hi his personality 
I 11 dtji 1 * L I.Ji li J n suspiciousness ot others , to ilea .1 m i th 
hits social anxiety around others, to deal, with his 
Impression mull n 1 i Mi I I i basically one on one. 
II sometimes happens in qioup counseling, "There are a 
variety of approaches and theories. That Is the structural 
lliswni 
Q In terms of the requirements of Mr, Anderson, 
that would have to be a regular onqoinq adult psychotherapy?1 
A "i i II i in II i II mi nil I L K I J l i e I I mi II II i «y i n I I I I I III in mi I h u I i i | ,' 
f o r some form oi d i io thei un a woekly b a s i s for p robab ly a 
year and a ha l f or I m, jit l e a s t , coupled wi th a l l of t h e 
I ' I h i i i " ' 1 1 1 • i ii II 1 1 I I II h i i 1 1 < i a i • 
Q Win n | mi ""treatment," a r e you t r e a t i n g t he se 
d i f f e r e n t diagnoses you descr ibed? i s Russe l l Anderson 
goi :i> g t ::: gcii r iJ" 
A I think that he will get better. You are asking J 
that as sort of a loaded terra in terms of what "better" I 
means exactly. He will reach the point where several I 
years down the road, assuming all of the other things I I 
just laid out, he would be able to function in a serai- J 
structured environment like a halfway house. I don't know, 
given his past history, whether I would be competent in 
predicting much beyond that, whether he would ever be 
able to function again solely in the community on his 
own. 
Q Let me narrow the question. 
A Less likely. 
Q Will his retardation get better? 
A The fundamental retardation will not get better. 
The skills that he has to deal with that retardation can 
change. 
Q How about what you have described as organic 
personality syndrome, schizoid personality disorder, 
schizo-type? 
A Those kinds of disorders similarly can change 
too. To give you an analogy, individuals who have a 
serious car accident and receive very serious damage to 
the brain, and who have thereafter kind of an explosive 
and impulsive pattern of responding to frustration, can 
in fact be trained. It takes several years. Can be trained 
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i 1 I 11 in I I i' i n t J I, i u- • w 11 | « 111 1II1»a I 11 in | W i l l i 1 I in ( M i in 11 mi 11 in i I  s J I i v i 1 y , 
f ' h e y w i l J s t i l l p r o b a b l y e x p e r i e n c e t h e i m p u l s e s t o 
s t r i k e o u t , b u t t h e y l e a r n o t h e r s k i l l s o f h o w t o d e a l 
I mi I In i I I l id I i ,'i whi t I I in 'din w i n in II ' Vj " o o y i i i i II, i n I .. 
social skill training" for persons like Mr, Anderson. 
Q Tha t i s in r eqa rd s t o t he oig a nIc ? 
A A n:! Ilii •.< social judgment and the retardation, 
Q What about in terms of the schizo-type? 
A The under lyi nq part that; is more relevant is 
I lie degree ol tension and anxiety that lie teeJs around 
other people. This is a term of ait, but: to translate it 
in nit n I in1 l.iiiujni up tii 11 if in If imeiins I •'• that" wh i U» wc e x p e r i e n c e 
interacting with other peuple, some of tlieiiu we like and 
some of then we dislike as an ordinary task, of everyday 
II II I II II 11 in I I in I11! i n i f i i n n , II In 11 r e SITM'IK"*3 o f iHieir peoph'1 
Iiust 1 lie sheer presence ot other people around him, 
induces a rather substantial amount of clinical anxiety,, 
i l l I II II mi 111 II i II II II II Il i l l i i l l Ii T h e i P .I'll i" ( w a v si t I"I I I P 1 p p e o p l e 
deal with those kind of anxieties. 
Q So, those problems are t^eataJDle? 
A V i " i . 
Q Your diagnosis of Mr, Anderson,,, there i s with i n 
it, I note that you used DSM categories of disorders, 1 ou 
llihivi! nil i I I I |HOSHI1 n'H'iri a t in p»»r soma II ill h s o i c i e r s ? 
A Y e s . 
"";,.6 
Q And an organic problem which is not a personality 
disorder s Organic personality syndrome? 
A Correct• 
Q And beyond that retardation? 
A Correct. 
Q The defect, the mental defect of which you spoke 
earlier is based on one or all or — 
A You want to translate the DSM3R categories into 
9 I that language of mental disease or defect. The personality 
disorders are diseases, and so is the probable organic 
personality disorder. The mental retardation is a defect. 
He needs both sides of that "or" clause, in other words. 
Q You prepared an addendum to your initial report? 
A Yes. 
5 | MR. LEMCKE: Your Honor, I don't believe that 
requires admission as an exhibit. The Court should receive 
17 I that simply as one of the reports of the alienists that it 
8 I called for coming in. 
t9 J MR* BRADSHAW: We would ask the Court to consider 
20 I it and move for its admisison. 
21 I MR. LEMCKE: We have no objection to that. 
22 THE COURT: Well, it is received. 
23 I MR. BRADSHAW: That is all I have. Thank you. 
24 I THE COURT: Mr. Bradshaw, before you finish, let 
25
 I me have counsel back to the bench just a moment. 
7 j J 
I 
6 
57 
